The conclusion to the parable of the tenants in Mark (12.1b-9) involves the vineyard owner killing the refractory tenants and re-letting his vineyard to others. In legal terms the man employs 'self-help' -the satisfaction of a real or pretended claim without the permission of the defendant or the intervention of a court. Most advocates of a metaphorical approach to the parable (Pesch, Snodgrass, Evans, Hultgren), and some who argue that Jesus spoke in realistic fiction, have argued or assumed that Mark 12.9 is an original part of the parable, believing it to be a 'realistic' element of Mark's story. But an examination of Greek, Roman, GraecoEgyptian, and biblical legal rulings indicates that resorts to self-help were discouraged and even criminalized in this period. Mark 12.9 is not a realistic component of the parable, but is part of its secondary allegorization.
later Jesus movement. This is because the story is said to employ metaphors that would be readily intelligible to Jesus' Jewish audience. This view normally entails the claim that Jesus was speaking self-referentially when he described the activities and fate of the 'beloved son', 5 although a few scholars try to avoid the self-referential implications of the parable altogether, 6 or argue that the 'son' here refers to John the Baptist. 7 On any of these views, however, the parable still offers an allegorical reading of the history of Israel: it expressed God's continuous assertions of sovereignty and his unrelenting efforts to win repentance, 8 or it served as a threat of judgment and destruction, 9 depending on whether the statement about the destruction of the tenants in v. 9 is considered part of the original parable or not.
The third approach follows in the train of C. H. Dodd and Joachim Jeremias, insisting that the parables of Jesus are realistic fictions. 10 This approach tries to [Fabel] aspires to overcome resistance by speaking the story so attractively, so warmly and freshly, that the auditor will not be able to think of any objection. It makes the matter seem so probable that the auditor does not ask whether it is true' (my translation). Similarly C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, rev. edn (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1961) 5: 'At its simplest the parable is a metaphor or simile drawn from nature or common life, arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease recover a non-allegorical, realistic story behind Markan redaction or in the Gospel of Thomas (GThom), a procedure that normally involves stripping away certain details of the parable such as the allusions to Isa 5.1-7 LXX, the awkward summarizing statement in v. 5b, the designation of the 'son' as aj gaphtoṽ, and part or all of v. 9. While the conclusions of Jülicher and Kümmel are founded (in part) on the claim that the parable lacks verisimilitude with social and economic conditions of Jewish Palestine and thus distinguishes itself from Jesus' other parables, both the second and the third approaches require verisimilitude. This is obvious, of course, in the case of the third view: it is basic to the approach of Dodd and Jeremias and their successors to reconstruct a story whose details are essentially credible, even if the story concerns a rather singular or shocking event. For on this view the parable gains its effect, first by evoking in the hearer certain expectations or beliefs about the world or cultural scripts, and then by challenging or problematizing those expectations, beliefs, and scripts through its narrative. But it can do this only if the story is told in a generally realistic mode.
But realism is also important to the second, metaphorical, approach. On this view, even though the parable is said to contain elements that have metaphorical valences, and that the act of interpretation amounts to the hearer assembling various metaphorical elements into a coherent picture, a high degree of realism is required in the base or 'host story'. If the 'host story' were to be unrealistic or to contain implausible elements, the picture evoked at the metaphorical level would likewise lack coherence and therefore conviction.
An example of the metaphorical approach is found in Hans-Josef Klauck's treatment of the parable. He rejects the thoroughgoing allegorizing of all of the 498 john s. kloppenborg elements of the parable, since this inevitably produces incoherences or aporiae. For example, since the vineyard is ultimately taken away from the tenants, it is difficult to identify it with Israel. And the temptation to equate the slaves with the prophets faces the objection that the mission of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible was not to collect 'fruit', but rather to encourage repentance. 11 But Klauck also rejects the thorough de-allegorizing of the parable. Instead, he insists on the metaphoricity of selected elements of the parable and assembles these into a coherent picture. His principle of selection derives from other elements of the Jesus tradition that appear also to have had metaphorical valences. The figure of the vineyard, although it acquired various metaphorical senses in the Hebrew Bible and in the literature of Second Temple Judaism, has no obvious metaphorical sense in Matthew's parables of the vineyard workers (Matt 20.1-16) or the two sons (Matt 21.28). And if the vineyard is without metaphorical significance, neither does the notion of 'inheritance' (v. 8), which the parable identifies with the vineyard. But the douloi of the parable in this and other parables, though they do not refer to the prophets, function generally to illustrate the relationship between humans and God. The main figure of the parable must refer to God; and the 'son', though it need not evoke specifically messianic beliefs, 'refers in an indirect fashion to the person and activities of Jesus, just as do the figures of the physician, the bridegroom and the sower'. 12 From this, and from the narrative structure of the parable, it follows that Jesus was conscious that he was in the final stages of his activities and that his (violent) death was near. Thus Klauck concludes:
in the parable of the wicked vinedressers, Jesus expresses his own fate in an indirect, i.e., parabolic, relation to the kingdom. His death is the unavoidable result of the mission to which he is committed. But his death remains rooted in the will of God, who will bring about his kingdom, even if its envoys are frustrated. Thus the parable decisively makes a claim about God and his continuous claims to sovereignty -a fact that agrees with the formal observation concerning the central role played by the owner at the level of the narrative. 13 This point, however, can have its effect only if the general narrative structure of the parable exhibits verisimilitude. The metaphorical picture is as it were parasitic on the 'host story', and were the host story to prove incredible, the logic of the metaphorical picture would be contaminated. So Klauck, drawing on Martin Hengel's influential essay on the parable of the tenants and the Zenon papyri, 14 argues that the essential details of the host story are thoroughly credible: it was unexceptional for vineyard owners to lease out (ej kdidov nai) their vineyards and become absentees; crop-share leases, implied by Mark's lav bh/ aj po; twǹ karpwǹ tou` aj mpelwǹo~(12.2), were one of the usual types of leases; it was not unusual for tenants to resist the extractions of owners; and occasions of physical violence are attested. Hence, '[t]he parable of the vinedressers employs realistic set-scenes on the narrative level. Realism is no more strained and no farther removed than in other parables'. 15 Other advocates of a metaphorical approach to the parable argue for an even greater degree of metaphoricity. Both Ruldolf Pesch and Klyne Snodgrass argue that the parable began with an allusion to Isa 5.1-7 -a feature which would incline the parable to be understood as a story about God and God's people. 16 The sequence of servants sent and abused would inevitably have been heard as a metaphor for the mistreatment of the prophets by Israel, culminating in the murder of the final eschatological messenger, Jesus. Because both Pesch and Snodgrass believe that Mark 12.9, with its allusion to Isa 5.4, is part of the original parable, both think that the parable functioned as a threat of judgment against those who rejected Jesus (Pesch), specifically the priestly elite (Snodgrass). 17 same time, however, both insist that the host narrative is thoroughly realistic, without any subtraction of elements such as the allusion to Isa 5.1-7 in 12.1, 9, or the awkward phrase in 12.5b, which Klauck had eliminated as redactional. 18 Craig Evans further tries to show that Mark's setting of the parable, which directs it against the priestly elite of Jerusalem, is thoroughly plausible given the fact that ancient lessees were not uniformly 'peasants' but could also be more privileged renters. 19 23 Nevertheless, Hultgren also insists that the features of the story are not unrealistic and that it is not absurd to think that an owner would send his son when previous envoys had been mistreated, or that the tenants might have believed that they might come into possession of the vineyard by resisting the extractions of the owner, or again that the owner at the end would reassert his claims to the vineyard. 24 Thus while it is possible to admit that some of the actions described in the 'host story' might be striking or even somewhat unusual -such as tenants killing a legal heir -there must be an isomorphic relationship between the basic claims, assumptions, and narrative line of the host story and the claims and assumptions made at the level of the metaphorical picture. Just as vineyard owners normally let out their properties, expect rent, employ agents, might anticipate resistance, and are entitled to assert their claims by force if necessary and to re-let their properties, so God has a proprietary relationship with Israel, and despite resistanceeven violent resistance -it is credible that God would continue to exert claims to sovereignty via agents and a son (Klauck) and even to dispossess with force those who resist his claims and turn his favour to others (Pesch; Snodgrass; Evans; Hultgren). 502 john s. kloppenborg 20 While insisting on the realism of the parable, Evans ('God's Vineyard', 390-7, 405) also cites rabbinic parables in which characters act in 'illogical and unreasonable ways'. This observation cuts against his first point, since the actions of the characters in Mark must be judged either realistic or illogical, but not both. 21 Although Hultgren (Parables of Jesus, 357, 361) recognizes that the allusion to Isa 5.2 in Mark 12.1 is Septuagintal, he nonetheless asserts that the parable is based on Isa 5.1-7. 22 Hultgren (Parables of Jesus, 361-2) argues, following GThom, that the original parable had only two servants (neither killed), followed by the son. 'The popular "rule of three" could have been employed, which would have required the sending of one slave and then two others, followed by the sending of the son (as in Luke), or (more likely) the sending of one slave, then another, followed by the son (as in the Gospel of Thomas).' 23 Ibid., 361-2. 24 Ibid., 362-7, following Derrett's ('Wicked Husbandmen') speculation about the tenant's resort to laws of adverse possession.
Mark 12.9 and the original parable
One of the key disagreements among those who maintain the realism of the parable concerns the final sequence of the Markan version, where the owner takes it into his own hands to destroy the first tenants and then to re-let the vineyard to others. Opinion does not divide neatly on this issue, although virtually all advocates of a thoroughly realistic story -Dodd's and Jeremias's approachexclude either v. 9b (the destruction of the tenants and the re-letting of the vineyard) or the entire rhetorical question and answer (v. 9ab). 25 Those who adhere to a metaphorical interpretation, with the exception of Klauck, 26 include all of v. 9 in the parable. 27 The issue turns not on Mark's phrase, kai; dwv sei to; n aj mpelwǹa a[ lloi~, which is in fact a thoroughly realistic element of the story, though Jülicher thought otherwise. 28 Lease agreements regularly contained a clause permitting the lessor, without any legal guarantees when he leaves the country, who sacrifices one servant after another to the brutal mistreatment of those good-for-nothings without noticing the futility of his approach, and, when all his servants have been murdered, nevertheless offers his only son when he also possesses the power at the end to dispatch the tenants and the desire to in the event of default, to expel (ej kbav llein) the lessee from the object of the lease and to re-let it (metamisqouǹ) to others. 29 Rather, the issue has to do with Mark's rhetorical question, tiv ªou\ nº poihv sei oJ kuv rio~ tou` aj mpelwǹo~, and the owner's remedy: ej leuv setai kai; aj polev sei tou; gewrgouṽ, a remedy which in legal terms is 'self-help' -the satisfaction of a real or pretended claim without the permission of the opponent and without the intervention of a court. 30 Three arguments have been adduced against the originality of v. 9. The first is form-critical. Ever since Dodd it has been argued that while a parable might end in a question, it was not characteristic for Jesus to answer his own questions. 31 Although Dodd did not document this claim, perhaps he had in mind the fact that Jesus is represented in Matt 21.31, Luke 10.36 and Luke 16.20 as asking questions that are either left unanswered or are answered by an interlocutor. The difficulty with such an argument, however, is that on the one hand it seems precarious to generalize from just three examples, and, on the other, there are counterexamples such as Luke 17.7-10 and 15.4-7, 8-10 which are framed as questions (tiṽ ªa[ nqrwpo~/gunh; º ej x uJ mwǹ) that are answered by Jesus.
Of the remaining objections, one has to do with the rhetorical question (12.9a) and the other with the answer (12.9b). Critics since Jeremias have pointed out that the wording of Mark's question bears a striking similarity to the conclusion of 504 john s. kloppenborg find yet another set of farmers -this is a vineyard owner who is every bit as unlikely a person as tenants who not only withhold from the owner what belongs to him, but engage in meaningless provocation and calculate the murder of the son without taking the owner himself into account!' (my translation The final consideration concerns the narrative logic of 12.9b in the context of the parable as a whole. Crossan puts the objection most trenchantly:
The whole idea of a punitive expedition by the master is very improbable against the rest of the story. If such power had been available to him, the pathetic hope for respect [in v. 7] becomes somewhat ludicrous. The punishment theme is an allegorization of the influx of Gentiles into the church. 33 The first (form-critical) objection to the originality of v. 9 is rather weak, but the Septuagintal character of 12.9a and the implausibility of 12.9b weigh seriously against this verse.
A number of options are open to defenders of the integrity of 12.9, but none is very convincing. Some argue that Isa 5.1-7 is integral to the structure of the parable, 34 despite the clearly Septuagintal nature of the allusions. 35 Others contend that if the parable began with at least some elements of Isa 5.2, however reduced, then it might also have concluded with an adaptation of Isa 5.4, 5. 36 Pesch urges that the fact that v. 9 continues in the idiom of a vineyard story favours its authenticity. 37 But it is a relatively simple matter to adduce examples of secondary elaborations which preserve the idiom and imagery of the sayings to which they are attached. 38 Hultgren can only assert that 'rhetorical questions and answers are by no means out of place in the parables of Jesus . . . so the question and answer need not be out of place here either'. 39 While the arguments in favour of the originality of v. 9 are weak and the considerations against its originality substantial, there is a certain irony in the views of those who excise v. 9b from the original parable. Dodd argues that v. 9b was not present in the original parable, but then concludes that Mark's answer to Jesus' question was a 'natural conclusion to the story' and that the owner would of course retaliate in just the way that Mark renders explicit. Thus the parable 'may be said to "predict" [both] the death of Jesus and the judgment to fall on his slayers'. 40 Likewise Hengel: while uncertain in regard to the status of v. 9, he nevertheless concludes:
Der Duktus der Parabel läuft so mit inner Folgerichtigkeit auf den durch die rhetorische Frage in 12.9a angestrebten Schluß zu: Der abscheuliche Frevel der Pächter muß das unerbittliche Strafgericht des Besitzers herausfordern. Auch hier wird die Bildseite in keiner Weise durchbrochen. 41 Herzog, perhaps one of the commentators most sensitive to social issues in first-century Jewish Palestine, concludes that the question in v. 9a implies its own answer:
Galilee and Judaea were in the midst of significant change during the early decades of the first century, primarily through the forces of commercialization. Pressure brought to bear on peasants through the takeover of land was one important factor. The parable codifies such a land seizure. Oppression generates violent reactions because it continually feeds the first phase of the spiral of violence. But in a world where elites controlled the means of production of weapons and retained armies to use them, revolts reproduced the impotence that ignited them, and legitimated more intense forms of repression. In its closing question, the parable codifies the futility of violence under these circumstances. 42 Hester, who expressly argues against the originality of v. 9, nevertheless tries to normalize Mark's answer, citing two theory-based principles. On the one hand, according to Gerhard Lenski, violent are always taken very seriously. The severity of the punishments undoubtedly reflects a recognition of the existence of widespread, latent hostility toward the holders of power and the realization that anything less than prompt and severe punishment may encourage more widespread violence. 43 On the other, in Mediterranean culture the killing of one's kin amounted to a challenge to honour and would 'require a response nothing short of vengeance on the part of the owner'. 44 Hence in an odd way, these commentators seem eager to absolve Jesus of expressly evoking the violent destruction of the tenants by the owner, but then reintroduce the notion just excluded by appealing to what the hearer would have taken to be the obvious conclusion to such a story.
Self-help in Graeco-Roman and Palestinian law
But is this expectation self-evident? To those who read the story through the lens of God's destruction of Isaiah's vineyard (Isa 5.4-6), it is probably self-evident that the owner would retaliate in this fashion, destroying the tenants as a natural prelude to re-letting the vineyard to others. 45 But is it safe to assume that in a story realistically narrated a resort to self-help would be expected?
The scenario imagined by Mark 12.1-8 and GThom 65 is generally realistic. 46 Because vineyards were highly capitalized agricultural enterprises, with costly installations and requiring expensive iron tools, and because the crop commanded relatively higher prices than grain, vineyards were frequently the sites of conflict. We hear of tenants being ejected from their leases by landlords during the course of the lease, 47 of tenants being expelled or otherwise impeded by the Self-Help or Deus ex Machina in Mark 12.9? 507 opponents of the owner, 48 of landlords' agents being assaulted, 49 of outright occupation of another's property, 50 of the theft of the harvest or of valuable vine props and viticultural implements, 51 of tenants going on strike to protest extractions of their landlord, 52 and of numerous acts of violence. 53 Owing to a peculiar feature of Hellenistic property law, the relationship between lessor and lessee was made additionally more complicated. Unlike modern consensual contracts, the Hellenistic lease had features of a 'conveyance of property, accompanied by a covenant providing for certain obligations incurred with respect to, and in connection with, this conveyance'. 54 In this type of contract, the lessor delivered (ej kdidov nai; cf. Mark 12.1, ej xev deto auj to; n gewrgoi`) the property to the lessee, who thus gained a temporary and limited title to it. 55 Sometimes the lease contained a bebaiv wsi~clause guaranteeing the lessee against molestation by the lessor or by any third party related to the lessor. 56 At the expiration of the lease period, the lessee was required to return (aj podidov nai) the property, but, as Wolff notes, the tenant was under no contractual obligation to return the property. The expiration of the term simply restored the full title of the landlord who was 508 john s. kloppenborg now in a position to recover his land by such judicial or extra-judicial acts as were allowed to every kuv rio~not in possession of his property, while the tenant was no longer protected against ejectment. 57 In the case imagined by the parable of the tenants, what remedies were open to the owner? As noted above, leases regularly contained provisions allowing the lessor to expel (ej kbav llein) tenants from the object of the lease in the event of default, usually the failure to deliver the rent. 58 It should be noted that ej kbav llein carries with it the connotation of force. But the actual procedure for action in the case of default was cumbersome: the plaintiff had to apply to the prav ktwr (bailiff) or his assistant (uJ phrev th~) and to the local court which, after examining pertinent documentation, issued the bailiff with an order of execution. But instead of actually executing the order, the bailiff merely delivered the order to the defendant, allowing him or her the opportunity of a formal response. 59 Only if there was no response did the court then allow execution on the defendant's property, after the plaintiff had sworn an oath that his declarations were true. 60 The very unwieldy nature of these procedures is probably the reason why additional penalty clauses are found in many lease agreements, imposing substantial fines in the case of default. 61 This was a strong disincentive for a vexatious tenant tempted to frustrate the lessor by resistance and then simply to hand back the property when resistance was no longer possible or prudent. 62 Even so, we hear of cases of a defendant ignoring private attempts at negotiation and even refusing to acknowledge his debt before the bailiff. 63 The imaginary case of the parable of the tenants, of course, concerns not merely a refusal to produce rent, but violence against the owner's agents and the killing of his son. Snodgrass, in an effort to render the owner's resort to self-help plausible, opines:
It is not necessary to justify legally the owner's punishment of the tenants. Under the circumstances, probably no objection would or could be made if he did kill the tenants. Our concern is that this feature of the parable is in keeping with rabbinic parables and the inadequate administration of justice at the time. 64 Snodgrass appeals to BGU 4.1122 (13 bce), which contains a (standard) clause threatening a defaulting tenant with immediate imprisonment. 65 But apart from the fact that the clause says nothing of the killing of a defaulting lessee, it is not relevant in any event, since the document concerns a 'Persian of the descent' (Pev rsh~ th` ej pigonh`), a pseudo-ethnic designation found in Graeco-Egyptian contracts and applied to persons below the status of the Macedonian settler class, and prohibited from resorting to a claim of asylum. 66 We have no evidence of an analogous class of persons in Jewish Palestine.
In fact it is quite unlikely that any law permitted an owner to act as Mark's owner did. It is true that Greek, Roman, and Jewish legal traditions permitted a degree of self-help in the execution of justice. This was a necessity, given the inadequate police resources in cities and towns, and the almost complete absence of police in the countryside. Athenian law in the classical period permitted the application of lethal force in the absence of a court decision, but only in the case of adultery and housebreaking. The common denominator here is the transgression of the boundaries of the oi\ ko~and, hence, the affront to the honour of the kuv rio~. 67 But the prosecution of other injuries had become the jurisdiction of 510 john s. kloppenborg 65 BGU 4.1122.24-6: ej a; n dev ti ªª. . .ºº parabaiv nw(sin) ei\ nai auj to(u;) parac(rhma) ⁄ aj gwgiv sªm(iu~)º kai; sun(ev cesqai m)ev cri pou` ej ktis(ai) a{ te e[ cousi tou` misqou` kai; ⁄ o} ej a; n mev ro~ lav bw(si) so; n hJ (mioliv a/ ), 'If they should default on any of these conditions they shall immediately be liable to arrest and imprisonment until they repay both the wages that they have received and whatever portion, with an extra added half, of whatever else they received'. On self-help in the case of housebreaking, see Demosthenes 24.113: 'If a man should steal anything whatsoever at night, it is permitted that his victim in pursuit, kill him, wound him, or lead him by apagō gē to the Eleven if he wish'; Demosthenes 23.60: 'If one kills immediately in defence of one's property a man carrying or leading it away by force or unjustly, he is killed with impunity.'
Athenian courts, which thus became a major forum in which feuding, rivalry, and honour displays took place. 68 And homicide had been within the court's purview since the Draconian laws of the seventh century. In Roman practice the Law of the Twelve Tables had allowed the killing of a thief caught at night or using a weapon, but had required that this be done only after convening an emergency council of neighbours, this provision to guard against murder disguised as a response to housebreaking (8.12-13). 69 It was also taken for granted that a plaintiff could physically bring a defendant to court if the defendant otherwise refused (manus iniecto). 70 And self-help might be used where judicial protection was inadequate and where self-help was the only means to avoid irreparable damage. 71 By the first century bce, Roman jurists had moved to limit severely the resort to self-help. In the case of land taken by fraud or force, it had been legal under the Lex agraria of 111 bce for the owner to re-acquire the land by force, and legal to use force in the defence of property. Obviously, both parties to a dispute over ownership could appeal to such principles. 72 Moreover, it was not always feasible to use self-help when the occupier of the land had superior power; hence, the Lex agraria guaranteed restitution through the courts to one ejected from his lands, who had not himself acquired them by force or fraud. 73 But by the first century bce, the use of violence was further limited: first by Lucullus's edict de vi armata of 76 bce, directed against the use of arms and gangs; 74 then by interdicts recent Self-Help or Deus ex Machina in Mark 12.9? 511 in Cicero's day, which forbade the resort to violence in the advancement of claims over land, whether or not it was rightfully one's possession; 75 and finally by the Julian lex de vi publica and lex de vi privata of the late Republic, which criminalized the use of arms in expelling someone in possession of a farm (Dig. 48.6.3), 76 imposing a fine of one-third of the property of anyone convicted under this statute (Dig. 48.7.1-5). 77 By the late Republic, as Lintott observes, 'the righting of wrongs is no longer an irrefutable excuse for violence'. 78 Thus if considered under Roman law, the vineyard owner of Mark's story was not only not justified in applying lethal force in the recovery of his property, but, even if he could demonstrate that he had an unassailable claim to it, would still be liable to a punitive fine under the Julian law.
Prevailing law in late Ptolemaic and early Roman Egypt similarly made selfhelp problematic. Of course it was still permitted to restrain a thief and bring him to a magistrate, although as PMich 6.421 (41-68 ce) illustrates, this could be a risky whatever weapons were used, deaths rarely occurred. However, with the growth of estates, presumably in the second century [bce] , and the corresponding growth of familiae of slaves, this kind of violence began to be a problem, for an armed gang of slaves would have turned a fracas into a battle. business. The plaintiff here complains that as he was trying to apprehend the culprit, he was himself imprisoned by customs-guards, apparently friends or accomplices of the thief, until the thief could make good his escape. But as Taubenschlag observes, other forms of self-help were not permitted in Graeco-Egyptian law. 79 The exceptions prove the rule. We have a few instances where persons who engaged in self-help themselves became the subject of legal proceedings. A papyrus from the Zenon archives records the complaint of a debtor whose wife and serving boy were seized and imprisoned by a creditor. 80 The petition requests the king to mete out the appropriate punishment 'for the imprisonment of a free person'. The same inducements against self-help are in evidence in the late first century ce when a prefect threatens to have a creditor beaten for having imprisoned a debtor and his wife. 81 The proper recourse in matter of debt recovery was the courts. 82 That resort to the courts was normal is indeed shown by a series of papyri from the third century bce to the second century ce, each concerning the (allegedly) illegal and sometimes violent occupation of a plaintiff's farm or house. For example, PEnteuxeis 65 (221 bce) records a petition to the strategos by a woman who complains that following the division of a vineyard, her two former co-partners forcibly expelled her vinedresser. Zenon himself had similar difficulties: PCairoZenon 3.59624 (250 bce) is a letter written to Zenon advising him of the violent occupation of one of Apollonios's vineyards and requesting that Zenon seek judicial relief. A few years earlier Apollonios wrote to Zenon to tell him that rivals had occupied some of his vineyards in Memphis, subjoining letters to the court (PCairoZenon 2.59179 [255 bce]). In the first century of the common era, POxy 49.3464 (54-60 ce) records an application to the strategos on behalf of a woman whose vineyard was seized and who, after one successful petition to the court, was Self-Help or Deus ex Machina in Mark 12.9? 513 still prevented from recovering it. A similar tale is told by a series of petitions (PMich 6.422, 423) by a certain Gemellus, whose property was violently occupied by a rival, Sotas, who later died, but whose brother Julius continued to harass Gemellus's tenant and to appropriate the harvest. 83 Whether Gemellus's repeated petitions restored his ownership is unknown.
What these documents show is that an appeal to the courts for legal redress was used not only by the women of PEnteuxeis 65 and POxy 49.3464, who probably lacked the ability to employ physical force in the pursuit of their claims, but also by Apollonios the dioiketes, who was clearly possessed of the ability to dislodge rivals by force should he wish to do so. Nevertheless, each of these appealed to the courts rather than resort to self-help. 84 In ancient Israel, as in classical Athens and the early Republic, there was a legacy of self-help. But as in these other jurisdictions, the state moved to curtail the unlimited or vexatious use of self-help. As early as the framing of the Pentateuch, Deut 24.10-12 forbade a creditor from entering the house of a debtor to seize a surety. And according to Exod 22.25-6, the cloak (to; iJ mav tion) of a debtor used as a surety had to be returned before sunset. 85 We are less well informed about the development of rulings on self-help in the Second Temple period, but it is instructive that the Mishnah, in the spirit of Deuteronomy, required a creditor to use a court to recover a debt. 86 Abraham Schalit surveyed legal practice in Herod's day and detected evidence of the influence of Hellenistic and Roman law concerning debt recovery. He suggested that the establishment of a tribunal alluded to in m. Ket. 13.1 to adjudicate cases of damage and injury is an example of such influence. 87 Apropos of selfhelp Schalit concluded: 514 john s. kloppenborg
In money matters no one in the first century of the Christian era in Jerusalem was entitled to take the law into his own hands, and there is no reason to think that in the first century bc the legal situation may have been different. 88 That Jewish Palestine was not exceptional in regard to the normalcy of resort to courts is reflected in the Jesus tradition itself. Q 12.58-9, on settling quickly with one's accuser, presupposes specific details of Hellenistic judicial procedure. The plaintiff (oJ aj ntiv diko~) and the defendant are imagined to be together ej n thỀ oJ dw/ prior to appearing before the judge. This is not because the two have by coincidence met on the road, but because one of the approved mechanisms of judicial procedure, in default of an adequate police force, was to have the plaintiff compel the defendant to come to court. 89 The procedure presupposed by Q also imagines the execution of the verdict by the uJ phrev th~(Luke: oJ prav ktwr), just as in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. 90
Conclusions
The implications of this survey should be clear. The owner's resort to lethal self-help is far from the self-evident or obvious response to the preceding events. It might indeed be imagined that the owner of Mark's parable took the law into his own hands, just as the defendants mentioned in PColZenon 2.83 or PFlor 1.61. 91 But in that case it would have been just the sort of violence that Roman, Graeco-Egyptian, biblical, and post-biblical laws sought to curtail and indeed to passed by the chrematists was thus effected: the plaintiff requested the chrematists to send a copy of the sentence to the prav ktwr xenikwǹ and to the strategos with the order to put it into effect. If granted, the eij sagwgeuṽ wrote the respective orders on the copies. The plaintiff handed the order to the prav ktwr xenikwǹ in person and to the strategos with a special application submitting the copy and the respective order . . . After that he gave the respective instruction to the local epistates. He issued to the prav ktwr xenikwǹ a similar order to start the execution.' In PColZenon 1.54.47 the order is delivered to the uJ phrev th~of the bailiff.
criminalize. 92 There is every reason to believe that judicial institutions existed in Jewish Palestine to allow for debt recovery and for actions on default. Indeed, Q 12.58-9 takes such an institution for granted. 93 In a realistic story of default and debt recovery, either the courts would have been involved, or it would have been clear that the creditor was overstepping normal practice in taking the law into his own hands. The fact that Mark's version of the parable betrays not the slightest degree of embarrassment over the owner's actions suggests that the details of 12.9 belong not to the realm of realistic story telling but to the metalevel of discourse about God's punishment of wrongdoers. Mark 12.9 in fact makes three assumptions that in no way can be judged realistic. First, it takes as self-evident that the owner would move against the tenants in order to dislodge them. But when much more powerful persons such as Zenon did not dare attempt this, and when lesser individuals clearly avoided punitive expeditions for fear of suffering physical injury themselves, this is clearly not an assumption that would have been self-evident to any first-century audience. Second, v. 9 assumes that the owner will undoubtedly succeed in recovering his property. But such confidence is scarcely realistic given actual reports of illegal occupation of farms and the difficulties that plaintiffs incurred in recovery. For even when one's claim to ownership was unassailable, it could not be taken for granted that recapture would be smooth or that it would occur at all. And finally, the conclusion to Mark's story takes for granted that the owner's resort to selfhelp was normal and, indeed, justified, betraying not the least interest in explaining or justifying what in fact was clearly an illegal resort to violence.
These three assumptions make sense only if one grants that the narrator of Mark's parable is self-consciously no longer speaking in a realistic vein, but is instead speaking of God's action. That is, at this point the narrator of Mark's parable has moved from the world of viticulture and contract law into the orbit of the gods and their prerogatives, despite his preservation of the idiom of a vineyard story. At this level, divine actions need no justification by a court; divine actions are believed to be unconditionally effective in securing their aims; and there is no reason to suppose that God would hesitate in acting once he had resolved to take 516 john s. kloppenborg action. In this appeal to a deus ex machina ending, the framer of Mark 12.9 does not invoke quotidian legal and economic realities, but reaches back to archaic representations of God, unfettered by considerations of human justice or judicial prudence, and to archaic codes of human behaviour, when the strong took and held their possessions by force. 94 We are left with two options. One is to insist on a metaphorical reading of the parable of the tenants as outlined above, despite the fact that what lends to the parable its primary metaphorical sense is a clearly Septuagintal allusion. But if one pursues this option, it must also be conceded that at a crucial point in the narrative -the owner's use of self-help -the parable fails the test of realistic actions and beliefs; the parable must be interpreted as an allegory adapted from Isa 5.1-7. As a judgment parable, Mark 12.9 is a necessary component of the story and cannot be detached. But insofar as the metaphorical reading requires that the 'host story' be realistic in order that the metaphorical picture also be coherent, at a crucial point the logic of the host story collapses. The owner's actions are simply not realistic as justifiable actions.
The other, and in my view preferable, alternative is to argue that the story, like other parables ascribed to Jesus, is a piece of realistic fiction whose effect is first to invoke certain expectations and beliefs about the world, in this case concerning landownership, absenteeism, and status-displays, and then to challenge them by means of the turn of its narrative. Seen in this way the parable relates a realistic story about the unsuccessful efforts of an owner to recover his property, efforts that end in the loss of his son and heir as well. On this view Mark 12.9 must be treated as a secondary allegorizing accretion to the story, together with the Isaianic allusions in 12.1b, the summarizing Deuteronomistic comment in 12.5b, and probably the designation aj gaphtoṽ in 12.6.
It is of more than passing interest that this is precisely the version of the story related in GThom 65, although I have arrived at the conclusion that Mark 12.9 was Self-Help or Deus ex Machina in Mark 12.9? 517
